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Authorised Secure Host Communication under 
Data Provenance Verification- A Signcryption 
Based Contract Signing Protocol
Bolladi Swathi α & P.Vasanth Sena σ
Abstract - The wide qualities of distributed (ex: P2P networks) 
network has given us many advantages and threats for 
enhancement of distributed computing. The best way to 
reduce threats is adding a reputation-based globally trusted 
model. Many present trust models are failing to restrain 
effectively some behaviors like collusive attacks, but pay no 
heed towards the security of this mechanism.
I. Introduction
f late, distributed computing has become 
popular and well recognized in a wide range of 
applications, like file-sharing, digital content 
delivery, and distributed Grid computing [1]. But the fact 
remains that, peer anonymity and autonomy make 
distributed networks easy towards attacks by any peer 
who is not rust worthy. The recent works [2-5] are a 
benchmark to the fact that the trust theories in social 
networks construct well recognized trust models, to find 
a solution for these kinds of behaviors.
The present reputation-based trust model 
designs trusted rank of a peer based on its past 
transactions, and it's similar to the peer with full trust 
value is offered the role of the service provider. This 
method has some advantages on any malicious 
behaviors to a certain extent, but has a meager effect 
when it comes to complex attacks and when 
disturbances are created on these reputation systems, 
like collusions. The researches now a day focus on the 
design and working of the trust system in all sensible 
arenas, and barely care concerning the security difficulty 
it faces which can damage the tag ―node consistency 
handling‖.  The security of node reliability handling is the 
most important element which assures a safe working of 
the trust management system (TMS). Thus, it is vital to 
develop and discuss about the security mechanism of 
the TMS.
Dealing by means of these research issues, we 
project node reliability based distributed trust model with 
the security mechanism that we refer as the secure node 
reliability     information     management     (SNRIM),   for  
 
 
   
 
 
   
  
distributed networks, which would scales better over 
node reliability information management(NRIM). 
II. Related work 
This sector gives a wide review of some of the 
present distributed node reliability systems, 
concentrating on problems like storage and veracity. We 
would like to at first give an outline of the node reliability 
systems. Kevin A. Burton designed an open privacy 
distributed node reliability system [5] on p2p, which 
hails from the distributed trust model which brought to 
us the idea of node reliability network, which is made up 
of identities and certificates. Therefore, the certainty of 
the identities is appreciated from a visible sub-graph of 
the reputable network. P2PREP [6], which is a node 
reliability sharing protocol designed for Gnutella, where 
every peer keeps track and shares the node reliability of 
their peers. Reputation sharing is made by distributed 
polling protocol. Service requesters use this trust by 
polling peers. Karl Aberer et.al. [7] Made a trust 
managing system on the distributed system which 
combines the trust and data management to construct a 
complete distributed architecture for information 
systems. The node reliabilities here are expressed as 
complaints; higher the complaints, less trustworthy it is. 
After every transaction, if there is dissatisfaction, a peer 
files a complaint stating the problem. To examine the 
node reliability of a peer involves searches for 
complaints about the peer. Kamvar et.al [8] proposed a 
node reliability management system, for distributed file 
sharing systems such as Gnutella fighting against the 
spread of inauthentic file. Here, every peer has a global 
node reliability that shows experiences of every peer 
with it. Sit and Morris [9] gave an idea for security of p2p 
networks. Their model permits nodes to make packets 
with arbitrary material, but lets the nodes not to intercept 
arbitrary traffic. They gave taxonomy of all varied attacks 
and at the routing layer, they find a node lookup, routing
table preservation, division the network and virtualization 
as threat to security. They deal also with multilevel 
protocols, like file storage, where nodes need not have 
the necessary invariants, like storage replication. They 
work also on denial-of-service attacks, and rapidly 
joining and leaving the network, or arranging for various 
nodes which sends bulk volumes of data to overload a 
O
Author α : M.Tech student at Dept of CSE, Sree Chaitanya College of 
Engineering,
Author σ : Associate Professor in Dept of Cse, Sree Chaitanya College 
of Engineering,
Karimnagar, AP,India. E-mail : swathi.bolladi@gmail.com
AP,India.
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
©  2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
II 
 I
ss
ue
 X
V
  
V
er
sio
n 
I 
18
  
 
(
DDDD
)
E
  
20
12
Y
e
a
r
Authorised Secure Host Communication under Data Provenance Verification- A Signcryption Based 
Contract Signing Protocol
victim‘s network connection (i.e., distributed denial of 
service attacks). Dingledine et al. [10] and Douceur [11] 
work on address spoofing assaults as well. Having 
several potentially hazardous nodes in the system and 
with no trusted central head which certifies node 
identities and become complex to know whether you 
can trust the claimed identity of somebody to an 
unknown. Bellovin [12] finds many problems with 
Napster and Gnutella. He discusses how complex it is to 
extent the use of Napster and Gnutella use via firewalls, 
and the ways they pass information that users feel is 
personal, like the search queries given. Bellovin 
researches also on Gnutella‘s ―push‖ feature, which 
functions on firewalls, useful for denial of service 
attacks. He feels Napster‘s central architecture more 
safe against these kind attacks, even if it needs users to 
trust the central server. It is to be renowned that a 
substitute reply for secure routing table maintenance 
and forwarding that we denied. This answer exchanges 
every node by a bunch of replicas as told by Lynch et al. 
[13]. The replicas are run using a state machine 
replication algorithm like BFT [14] that can sustain faults 
like Byzantine. BFT can replicate arbitrary state 
machines and, therefore, it can look like Pastry‘s routing 
table maintenance and forwarding protocols. Here, we 
look into Reputation Systems for distributed networks—
highly useful design which protects the distributed 
network without a central component, and amplifies all 
the advantages of the distributed network. 
III. Node reliability  systems 
A vital corollary of a good node reliability 
management is the online auction system eBay [9]. 
Here, buyers and sellers rate each other post 
transaction, and the final node reliability of a contestant 
is the ratings he has over the last 6 months. This system 
depends on a central system to store and manage 
these ratings. 
In varied areas nodes rate each other post 
transaction, like in eBay system. Like, every time peer I 
gets a file from peer j, it rates the transaction as positive 
(tr(i, j) = 1) or negative (tr(i, j) = −1). Peer i can rate a 
download as negative, if he finds the file inauthentic or 
tampered with, or if interrupted. Like in the eBay 
approach, we may possibly characterize a local faith 
value ijs as the sum of the ratings of the individual 
transactions that node i  has downloaded from node j : 
ij ijs ptr . 
Similarly, every peer i can store many 
transactions it has had with node j , ( , )sat i j and the 
number of intolerable transactions it has had with node
j , ( , )unsat i j . Then, ijs
 is defined: 
( , ) ( , )ijs sat i j unsat i j                                               (1)
 
Previous work in distributed node reliability 
systems [6, 1] are based on same notions of local trust 
values. The obstacle is in an environment is how to deal 
with the local trust values ijs without a central storage 
and management. Every previous system named above 
finds this problem; every system proposed has a couple 
of negatives. It mostly averages the ratings of some 
nodes and has no wide view about a peer‘s node 
reliability, or it averages the ratings of the nodes and 
congests the network with system messages 
questioning for every peer‘s local trust values for each 
query.
a) Threat Model
A Gnutella-like network has a power-law 
topology and helps Insert and Search techniques. The 
nodes have a predefined Join & Leave protocols. The 
nodes are connected with a communication channel 
which is not secure. As the nodes have opposing 
interests, a motivation is required to decrease leechers. 
Leechers are the ones who gain benefit from the system 
without giving anything to the system. The rogue nodes 
send malware in the network. Finally, nodes judge the 
quality before making Go/No-Go in every transaction 
and develop trust relationships mutually.
          A good node reliability system gives the way to 
achieve the target. Any node reliability system is open to 
ballot stuffing and bad mouthing as told in [18]. A poor 
node reliability system naturally gives problems that 
exploit the attackers. Peers should have unique way to 
handle to which their node reliabilities are tagged. If they 
are absent in trusted central agency, an attacker gathers 
infinite identities and gives recommendations to itself. A 
node can alter the reliability data in the network to uplift 
its node reliability and there are problems that are in the 
picture based on how a given node reliability system is 
made. We discuss those problems and their mitigation 
in the sections where the design decision is made.
b) Self-Certification
To participate in the node reliability system, a 
node should have handled. The reliability of a node is 
represented with handle. This handle is the ―identity‖ of 
the node even if does not ―discover‖ a node, i.e., it may 
not lead to the real-life identity of the peer. A node gets 
advices for every transaction, and all advices are stored 
together for calculation of the reliability of a node.
  In a central system, the head gives these 
identities. In a distributed node reliability system, self-
certification [33] divides the trusted entity among the 
nodes and gives their own identities. Every node has its 
own CA that gives the identity certificate(s) to the peer. 
All the certificates used here are same to SDSI 
certificates [6]. The name of a node is with its identity 
and the node reliability of a CA is the node reliability.
           Self-certification obviates the central trusted 
entity for giving identities in a central system. Peers 
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having self-certified identities are pseudononymous in 
the system as there isn‘t a way to map the identity of a 
node in the system to its real-life. Though anonymity or 
at least pseudonymity is required in distributed 
networks, in a node reliability system it is a double edge 
sword. If there is no mapping between multiple identities 
and the owner (peer), the system is open to Sybil attack 
or Liar farms.
         A node uses self-certification generating many 
identities and raises the node reliability of identities 
doing false transactions. The malicious node need not 
collude with distinct nodes to build its node reliability, 
but should generate a set of identities. The set of 
identities managed by one node is called an identity 
farm. The identities issuing a false recommendation are 
called a liar farm. These attacks are of the class of 
attacks named Sybil attacks. A node having an identity 
farm is as powerful subverting a node reliability system 
as a node colluded with many of other peers.
           An identity farm is countered if, a node is not 
allowed to one identity or all the identities of a node are 
sent back the peer. A node can be stopped to one 
identity by mapping its identity to its real-life identity and 
leaving anonymity, or by making the identity generation 
resource high that the node cannot generate more 
identities. Identity generated is made resource intensive 
by traditional micro-payment method, although the 
resource restrictions have a varied impact based on 
every peer‘s resourcefulness.
        In self-certification, we have a combination of 
approaches. Every node CA gives many identities. The 
advices received for a peer‘s identity from identities of  
peers, signed by the other peer‘s CA(s), are recognized 
as signed by the CA, and are made to counter the liar 
farms. In every transaction, the requester averages all 
the advices of the provider by CAs of the provider‘s last 
advisors. Hence, all the past advices owned by the 
provider are but they get averaged. Finally, it sums up 
the averages of each CA calculating the node reliability 
of the provider identity.
     Hence, a peer should not use its own identities 
(all generated by the same CA) to advice its other 
identities. 
        A determined peer can begin many CAs and 
give groups of identities. In order to oppose a rogue 
node with multiple CAs, the nodes are made to batches 
on various  grounds like a  node can't be a  part of many 
groups. For example, a distributed network in a city 
ensures the nodes by their zip codes. Every node gets 
its group certificate from the required head and attaches 
it to its CA. The certificate of a group head is publicly 
used by any node inside or outside the group. The node 
sends its credentials to the group and the head checks 
and signs the group certificate.
        Unlike the traditional CA or distributed CA ways, 
grouping of nodes has the anonymity of the peers; when 
grouped with self-certification it curtails the happening of 
a Sybil attack. In opposition to the traditional CA, neither 
the group head nor the transacting nodes establish the 
identity of the peer. The certificate revocations are not 
necessary in the group-based way as the group head 
vouches for the real-life of the peer, unlike the traditional 
certificate-based approaches where many certificate 
attributes are attested by the head and need revocation. 
If a good identity is adjusted, its misuses are self 
destructive as its node reliability will go down if misused.
   The node is named P while the head is denoted 
by A. Here P→A: X represents that the node (P) sends a 
message X to the head (A), here 2kP stands for the 
private key of P and 1kP represents the public key of 
the node . ( )kP E  represents encryption of the phrase 
(τ ) with K, while E kB (X) represents blinding phrase X 
with key K.
1. P→A:B1={E kaB ( rAliceI )}, AliceI The peer Alice 
gives a BLINDING KEY, K and identity for   herself 
rAlice
I ) Alice cannot be recognized from her identity 
(
rAlice
I ). She also blinds her identity (
rAlice
I ) with 
the blind key Ka. B1 stands for the blind identity. 
Alice passes B1 to the head with her real identity 
that approves her membership to a group.
2. A→P:B2=
2AuthorityKP
E {B1=E kaB ( rAliceI )}, AliceI   
The head attests the blinded identity, B1 and sends 
it (B2) back to the peer.
3.
2AuthorityKP
E {
rAlice
I } = E kaB {B2}}The peer un blinds 
the signed identity and extracts the identity 
authorized by the head 
2AuthorityKP
E {
rAlice
I }.
           The logic in the group-based way is that in a 
distributed network, nodes are interested in the ranks of 
providers than only the value of the node reliabilities. 
The simulations tell that this way varies the name of 
nodes but it having least effect on the relative ranks of 
the peers. This approach is from the Google page rank 
idea in which the pages in proximity of other don‘t give 
the page rank of the target page in the pages at a 
distance [34]. The relative ranks don‘t object the nodes 
from adjusting thresholds. The thresholds depend on 
ranks. Adjusting the thresholds for absolute values are 
have a limited utility. Google has ranks instead of links 
pointing to/from pages. It is clear from the Google 
corollary that rank-based mechanisms can be 
measured. Debates between there might be some 
systems needing absolute values still take place. This 
paper is not into that, as use of absolute values is more 
complex and is specific information that is not a part of 
our discussion.
         It is opposed and supported that this way is 
unjustified to nodes whose authentic advice are from 
(
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nodes that are a part of a large group. We support the 
argument and our implementations display that the 
relative ranks of the providers change the least. Hence, 
the providers are least influenced (∆ Mean Rank 
Difference≈14 for varied sizes groups) by the batches 
of advices. The requesters who give the advice to the 
providers can‘t be influenced by the batching of 
advices.
c) Node Reliability Model
The standard Join methodology is made use of 
by peer to connect itself to a specific distributed 
network. The search appeal entails the peer supplicant 
to produce a list of nodes who have the demanded 
file(s) with them. RANGE indicates the count of nodes 
who tender a mentioned meticulous file. The peer 
supplicant chooses the provider with the peak status by 
instigating the cryptographic procedure which involves 
the peer supplicant making use of the Download 
methodology of the network for downloading the 
relevant file mentioned by the client, which again assists 
in validating the reliability, dependability and the value of 
the file. A proposal is then sent to the peer client 
between min - recommendation and max -
recommendation, which are limited to the restrictions 
ensuring that a single implication doesn‘t utterly annul or 
radically improve the meticulousness of a supplicant. 
On receiving the suggestions from the client, it averages 
the prior received implications and incorporates the 
recently received ones to estimate its repute.  
The factors mentioned above can be assigned 
values by the means of  Decision Theory, Game Theory, 
and Probability and function F() is identified on the basis 
of intensity levels of menace faced by nodes in the 
distributed network. The function F() in this paper is 
described as the arithmetic average of the suggestions 
that are collected by the peer supplicant. The 
recommended node reliability copy is self governing as 
compared to topology of the distributed network, nodal 
addressing formats, bootstrap procedures, joining and 
leaving protocols of the nodes present and the name 
service. 
A negative suggestion may be issued by an 
applicant to the peer supplicant which may turn out to 
be hazardous concerning its node reliability even though 
the supplicant actually is worthy of a positive 
recommendation for a specified transaction. If in a way, 
only positive recommendations are accepted, then it 
would be tougher to distinguish between new and bad 
peers. Hence an assumption is made here that both 
positive and negative proposals are permitted and a 
given peer would no longer cooperate with those nodes 
who frequently deliver negative proposals. 
d) Contract signing between peers: a signcryption 
approach
The entire process starts here with the 
employment of RSA signature algorithm [42] otherwise 
known as Signcryption. At this point, the 1st user divides 
his private key d into d1 and d2 such that 1 2d d d  by 
following park[40]. The signature of this user has to be 
exchanged with the other and this signature is 
1( ) moddA h m n  . The partial signature generated 
by the 1st user is to assure that he has zero-knowledge 
base and this is done by Gennaro topology[27].The 
relations we have are defective owed to network failure 
or router‘s attacks [36],[46]. But, TTP is reliable since 
the messages inserted reach the destination for sure but 
with some delay.
i. Registration Protocol
The receiver of the information has only to 
record i.e. merely the recording process of the initiator 
with TTP is enough. He then gets a long-term voucher 
along with CA. After this, the following processes are 
done: (for our convenience, let the sender be BOB and 
receiver as ALICE.)
a. Alice first sets an RSA modulus
n pq
, where p
and q are two -bit safe primes, i.e., there exist two 
primes 'p and 'q such that '2 1p p  , '2 1q q  . 
After, Alice selects her random public key
*
( )R ne   , and calculates her private key
1 mod ( )d e n  , where ( ) ( 1)*( 1)n p q    . At 
last, Alice registers her public key with a CA to get 
her certificate AC , which binds her identity and the 
corresponding pubic key ( , )n e together.
b. Alice randomly splits d into 1d and 2d such that 
1 2mod ( )d d d n  by choosing * ( )1 R nd   , 
and computes
1
1 1 mod ( )e d n
 . She also 
generates a sample message-signature pair 
( , )  , where 
* \{1, 1}, ( ) ' 'n ord p q   
and
1d mod n  . Then, Alice sends 
( , , , 2)AC d  to the TTP but keeps 
1 2 1( , , , )d d d e secret.
c. The TTP first checks for the validation of Alice‘s 
certificate AC . After that, the TTP checks that the 
triple ( , , 2)d  s arranged correctly. If the whole 
thing is in exact order as per its rules, TTP saves d2 
and generates a voucher AV by computing
( , , )A TTP AV Sign C   . This proves the TTP‘s 
signature on message ( , , )AC      ,   which 
guarantees that the TTP can issue a valid partial 
signature on behalf of Alice by using the secret 2d .
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ii. Signature Exchange Protocol  
Before all this, a contract has to be agreed 
between bob and Alice and they should sign it. It should 
also has a deadline, and identify the Alice, Bob, and 
TTP. 
a) Initially, the initiator Alice has to compute her partial 
signature
1
1 ( ) mod
dh m n  , and then sends the 
triple ( , , )AC    to the responder Bob. Here, 
(.)h  is a cryptographically secure hash function. 
b) After receiving 1( , , )A AC V  , Bob first verifies that 
AC is whether issued by CA, and AV  is Alice‘s 
voucher created by the TTP. Then, Bob checks if the 
identities of Alice, Bob, and the TTP are correctly 
mentioned as part of the contract ‗m‘. If all these 
checking are ok, Bob initiates the below interactive 
zero-knowledge protocol with Alice to check 
whether 1 is Alice‘s valid partial signature on 
contact. 
i. Then Bob selects two numbers , [1, ]Ri j n  at 
random, and a challenge c  to Alice is sent by 
computing
2
1 mod
i j
wc n  . 
ii. Receiving the challenge c , Alice calculates the 
response mod
er c n
 She then returns her 
commitment ( , )r TCcom r t  to Bob using a 
random number t , where TCcom is the 
commitment algorithm. 
iii. After receiving the commitment r , Bob sends 
Alice the pair ( , )i j to acknowledge that he is 
done with the challenge c  properly. 
iv. Alice verifies for correct preparation of c, that is
2
1 mod
i jc n  . If ok, Alice withdraws his 
commitment r by knowing the responses ( , )r t  
to Bob. With this ( , )r t  , Bob knows 1 as valid if 
and only if 
2( ) modi jr h m n and 
( , )r TCcom r t . 
c) Bob checks the 1 Alice‘s valid partial signature 
and the deadline t  mentioned in contract m is 
whether enough for resolving the dispute resolution 
from the TTP. Then only he sends his signature B  
to Alice.  
d) After receiving B , Alice has to check whether it is 
Bob‘s valid signature. If it is, she sends Bob the 
partial signature 2  by computing
2
2 ( ) mod
dh m n  . As Bob receives 2 , he sets
1 2 modA n   , and accepts 2 as valid if and 
only if
22( ) mod
e
Ah m n  . Here, Bob can receive 
Alice‘s standard RSA signature A on message m
from A . If all this do not happen, Bob seeks the 
help of TTP for connection before the expiry of the 
date. 
IV. Node reliability exchange protocol 
The status swapping procedure is commenced
with the node supplicant when the node applicant 
chooses the supplicant with the highest status. This 
procedure requires the applicant to be represented as R 
and the node supplicant is represented as P. As in 
R→P: X represents that the node sends a message X to 
the supplicant (P).denotes private key of node P while 
1kP denotes public key of the peer . ( )kP E  denotes 
encryption of the phase (τ ) with key K and E KB (X) 
symbolizes blinding phrase with a key K. H(λ ) denotes a 
one way hash of the value λ . This procedure supposes 
that obtainable functions are inserting and search, but 
are not flexible enough for nodes which may not be 
proposed tag along the join and leave procedures of the 
network. The status swapping procedure contains the 
following phases: 
Step 1: R→P: RTS & IDR a REQUEST FOR 
TRANSACTION (RTS) is sent by the node applicant 
along with its own IDENTITY CERTIFICATE (IDR) to the 
node supplicant as it is required for authentication 
purposes in Step 7.  
Step 2: P→ R: IDP & TID & 
2kp
E (H(TID)∥RTS . 
The peculiar IDENTITY CERTIFICATE (IDP), the 
CURRENT TRANSACTION ID (TID) and the signed TID,
2kp
E (H(TID)∥RTS is sent by the node supplicant 
wherein signed TID is essential for the supplicant to 
avoid duplication of the usage of the same transaction 
id again. The applicant also applies for this signed TID 
and piles it up in the network at the end of the procedure 
for admission to other peers.  
Step 3: R : LTID ( Max (Search(PK1∥ TID)). The 
value of the LAST TRANSACTION ID (LTID) that was 
used by the supplicant is gathered by the node 
applicant who then combines the public ke P of the 
node supplicant along with the string TID and a search 
operation is carried out. Any node present in the network 
responds only when it has the relevant TID that is 
specified by the applicant and the node applicant 
chooses the highest TID out of all the TIDs received. The 
highest TID value becomes the LTID. It is certainly 
possible that the node supplicant may conspire with the 
node who piled up its last LTID and may modify it, but 
this is impossible as the applicant registers relevant 
information.  
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Step 4: R : IF(LTID≥ TID)GO TO Step 12 Foul 
play is presumed if the value of LTID initiated by the 
node applicant is originally from some other random 
transaction and applicant jumps to Step12.  
Step 5: R→P: Past Recommendation Request 
& r. If the step 4 check gives successful results, then 
applicant requests the supplicant for the earlier received 
proposals. If the current transaction being performed is, 
say Nth transaction, the applicant makes a head-on 
request for N-1th,N-2th,….,N-nth proposals where r<N. 
The node applicant is solely responsible for deciding the 
value of r and is considered to be directly proportional to 
the applicant‘s venture in the transaction. 
Step 6: P→R: CHAIN, 
2Kp
E (CHAIN) 
CHAIN=({RE 1NC  ∥ 1 2N KEZ  (H(RE 1NC  )}∥ 
{RE 2NC  ∥ 2 2N KZE  (H(RE 2NC  ,RE 1NC  ))} ∥   
{RE 3NC  ∥ 3 2N KZE  (H(RE 3NC  ,RE 2NC  ))}∥   
{RE 4NC  ∥  4 2N KZE  (H(RE N rC  ,RE 1N rC   ))}) 
The earlier received proposals RE 1NC  ,
 RE
2NC  ,……, RE 3NC   which were provided by   nodes 
1NZ  , 2NZ  ,….., 3NZ  .is sent by the supplicant. The 
CHAIN is singed so as to enable the applicant to hold 
supplicant responsible for the chain. The supplicant can, 
in no way, change the proposals that have been 
assessed by the earlier applicants. Consider an 
applicant (say 1Z ) has signed both the (ι  th) and the 
previous (ι -1th) recommendation using its private key 
2KZ , as 2KZnE (H(RE 3NC  ∥  RE ( 1)NC   )), in no way 
can a supplicant alter the CHAIN.  
Step 7:R : Result=Verify(RE 1NC  ;RE 2NC   
 RE N rC  ) 
If Result  != Verified GO TO STEP 12 
A simple public key cryptography protocol is 
employed by an applicant to authenticate the CHAIN. 
The authentication process is easier when a supplicant 
possesses certificates of all the nodes with whom it had 
connections earlier. In case it doesn‘t have one, it 
accumulates it from the supplicant itself. The provider 
had obtained its requester‘s certificate in Step 1. Liar 
farms (specified in Section 3.2, paragraph 2) are 
checked for by the applicant. The applicant jumps to 
Step 12 in case the authentication process fails.  
Step 8: Contract signing between node 
selected under node reliability check and node that 
requesting the service 
Signature exchange protocol will get into action 
between Peer ―SRP‖ that requesting the service and 
Peer ―SPP‖ that selected as service provider by node 
reliability check. 
Initially, the initiator SRP has to compute her 
partial signature
1
1 ( ) mod
dh m n  , and then sends 
the triple ( , , )AC    to the responder SPP. Here, (.)h  
is a cryptographically secure hash function. After 
receiving 1( , , )A AC V  , SPP first verifies that AC is 
whether issued by CA, and AV  is SRP‘s voucher 
created by the TTP. Then, SPP checks if the identities of 
SRP, SPP, and the TTP are correctly mentioned as part 
of the contract ‗m‘. If all these checking are ok, SPP 
initiates the below interactive zero-knowledge protocol 
with SRP to check whether 1 is SRP‘s valid partial 
signature on contact. Then SPP selects two numbers 
, [1, ]Ri j n  at random, and a challenge c  to SRP is 
sent by computing
2
1 mod
i j
wc n  . Receiving the 
challenge c , SRP calculates the response mod
er c n
 
She then returns her commitment ( , )r TCcom r t  to 
SPP using a random number t , where TCcom is the 
commitment algorithm. After receiving the commitment
r , SPP sends SRP the pair ( , )i j to acknowledge that 
he is done with the challenge c  properly. SRP verifies 
for correct preparation of c, that is 
2
1 mod
i jc n  . If 
ok, SRP withdraws his commitment r by knowing the 
responses ( , )r t  to SPP. With this ( , )r t  , SPP knows 
1 as valid if and only if 
2( ) modi jr h m n and 
( , )r TCcom r t . c). SPP checks the 1 SRP‘s valid 
partial signature and the deadline t  mentioned in 
contract m is whether enough for resolving the dispute 
resolution from the TTP. Then only he sends his 
signature B  to SRP. After receiving B , SRP has to 
check whether it is SPP‘s valid signature. If it is, she 
sends SPP the partial signature 2  by computing
2
2 ( ) mod
dh m n  . As SPP receives 2 , he sets
1 2 modA n   , and accepts 2 as valid if and only 
if
22( ) mod
e
Ah m n  . Here, SPP can receive SRP‘s 
standard RSA signature A on message m from A . If 
all this do not happen, SPP seeks the help of TTP for 
connection before the expiry of the date. 
Step 9: P→R : File or Service 
The file or service is afforded as per the 
obligation specified concerning search operation 
performed for the supplicants.  
Step 10: R →P : B1 =E KaB (REC∥  TID∥ 2KRE   
{H(REC, ∥  TID)}) 
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A BLINDING KEY (Ka) is produced by an 
applicant on receiving the service, who then combines 
the RECOMMENDATION (REC) and the TRANSACTION 
ID (TID) it had received in Step 2 and signs it. 
Consequently, the signed proposal is blinded along with 
the blinding key, Ka. This is done in order to entrust the 
supplicant to the proposal received before it actually 
knows the value, lest it disowns it on recognizing that it 
is low. It is also involves the fact that the supplicant 
made use of TID in a blinded suggestion from the node 
applicant, which is also authenticated by the applicant 
itself. The blinded proposal includes the Chain that is 
consequently used by the supplicant to certify its status 
to some other applicant.  
Step 11:  
a. P →R : B1∥ 
2KP
E (H(B1),nonce),nonce  
b. R→P : Ka 
A NONCE is sent by the supplicant after signing 
the proposal even though it is unable to see the 
proposal and acknowledges it back to the applicant, 
who then authorizes the signature and sends blinding 
key Ka to the supplicant to unblind the received string in 
Step10a and confirms the received proposal.   
Step 121: Insert 
(IDR;{REC ∥TID∥
2KR
E {H(REC) ∥ H(TID)}}) 
The proposal assigned to the supplicant (REC), 
the transaction id (TID), and its own identity certificate is 
verified by the applicant and is then accumulated in the 
network using Insert methodology of the distributed 
network which marks the end of the transaction.  
Step 13: Step 12 is concerning the 
methodology executed by an applicant when foul play is 
anticipated. 
ABORT PROTOCOL 
R: Insert (IDR; {CHAIN ∥TID∥
2KR
E {H(CHAIN) ∥ 
H(TID)}}) 
If the authentication process in Step7 fails, the 
applicant takes the CHAIN that was verified b the 
supplicant and also the TID is taken into consideration 
after which, it is signed and the Insert methodology is 
preferred to be made use of to insert the chain and also 
its own identity certificate into the network. 
Subsequently, any suitable applicant wil be able to 
confirm with the statistics of the failed authentication 
efforts and a MIN RECOMMENDATION for that TID is 
presumed for the supplicant. Fafe proposals cannot be 
encouraged to be inserted into the network as TID is to 
initiated that is verified by the supplicant. If an applicant 
reaches Step 12 from Step 4 without any possible 
hindrances, it will then apply for the Chain form the 
supplicant and will then afterward execute  
R :  Insert(IDR,{CHAIN TID {H(TID RTS))}})   . 
V. Analysis of the protocol 
Only a single search request is supposed to be 
commenced in the network so as to gather the already 
received proposals that were previously received by the 
supplicant. Also able to prevent the tampering node 
reliability provided by SRP to SPP by nodes that in path. 
This process is required the accountability of tackling 
the issue of unbalanced nature of availability of nodes in 
the network, which is measured to be a main subject 
concerning distributed networks.  
1. The supplicant unintentionally forwards the wrong 
TID in Step 2. Consider that id which the supplicant 
forwards as TID and the LTID be the last 
Transaction ID for the supplicant. The value of TID is 
always supposed to be equivalent to LTID + 1. If in 
case of TID' > LTID+1, there arises a situation 
wherein there will be inexplicable misplaced 
proposals. If again in case of TID' < LTID+1, then 
the supplicant will be caught up with in the Step 4 of 
the procedure, as the last id issued and used by the 
supplicant was made public and accessible to all 
the peers. The value of TID is considered as 0 if a 
node is for the first time donning the role of a 
supplicant.   
2. The transaction in Step 8 will not be terminated by 
the supplicant. A supplicant is allowed to abandon 
the transaction after providing the applicant with the 
requested requisite information in Step 8 and also 
can abandon the transaction after Step 9. In both 
the cases, there is an absence of a proposal by the 
supplicant for the transaction id TID. The proposal in 
Step 11 can be liberated by the applicant provided 
the supplicant fails to verify and sign the blinded 
proposal, without acquiring the supplicant‘s 
signature. In the next transaction, precisely TID+1, 
the supplicant again fails to illustrate the proposal 
for that relevant transaction, TID to the transaction‘s 
applicant, TID+1 and hence the new applicant 
entrusts itself with the job of scanning the network 
making use of Search methodology for TID. In case 
TID is found, the suggested proposals are also 
found out pertaining to the suppliant in the 
transaction. The applicant will then be responsible 
as the TID would by then have been signed b the 
supplicant, who will have to acknowledge the 
proposal as it comprises the signature of the 
supplicant, TID &
2KP
E  (H (TID)). A minimal 
suggestion TID is presented to the supplicant by the 
node applicant in the absence of the availability of 
the required proposal. If in Step 10, the supplicant 
acknowledges the signed blinded proposal B1 & 
2KP
E (H (B1)), the applicant refuses to send the key, 
Ka and directs itself to Step 10, missing all the 
requisite steps, and then the supplicant scans the 
entire network and acquires the verified proposal of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
©  2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
II 
 I
ss
ue
 X
V
  
V
er
sio
n 
I 
24
  
 
(
DDDD
)
E
  
20
12
Y
e
a
r
Authorised Secure Host Communication under Data Provenance Verification- A Signcryption Based 
Contract Signing Protocol
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
the applicant. If an applicant skips or fails to execute 
Step 10, then in the upcoming transaction TID+1, 
LTID is looked for by the new applicant and fails in 
his endeavor. Hence, TID can be considered as 
terminated and the next transaction can be 
continued with the transaction id provided, TID.  
3. Collusion by rogues or liar farms. All status systems 
are prone to complicity on account of its nature. It is 
possible for two or more liar farms to combine and 
conspire in order to augment each other‘s status. 
The influence of the conspiracy can be alleviated by 
classifying proposals on the basis of personage 
identities, substantiating agencies etc. The list of 
conspirators can be circulated, thereby, guarding 
the remaining nodes from an possible attack. Peers
when recognized as conspirators will not be 
permitted to get back into the stream of network 
and hence they have an impetus next to conspiracy. 
The series of proposals of the plotters will aid in 
offering support that few nodes are conspiring, 
thereby, protecting good nodes and from the 
intrusion of bad nodes into the network.  
4. Multiple requesters and concurrency. A supplicant 
in the presently used procedure will not be provided 
with the facility of making use of the same identity in 
the synchronized communication. The first option 
for process intensification is that the supplier 
identifies and familiarizes all its applicants with each 
other. As a result, the verification process performed 
in Step 4 is performed amidst a group of applicants 
and results are arranged in accordance with the fact 
that TID dissimilarity needs to be initiated due to 
more number of applicants. After integrating the 
augments, there would be a bi party procedure that 
would still be prevalent where the cluster of 
applicants is considered to the second party while 
the supplicant is supposed to be the first party.  The 
figure 1 explores the ability of the proposed model 
to prevent the false node reliability submitted by 
unauthorized nodes that acts as a service request 
node SRP. 
We can observe that contract signing by 
signcryption approach is most effective to prevent the 
node reliability tampering attacks. Even node 
communication with contract signing also victimized few 
times but victimization occurred due to contract signing 
breakage. Hence if contract sign is alive then attacked 
to tamper the node reliability is almost null. The figure 2 
confirms the stable growth in execution time when 
considers this contract signing process, which was 
compared with node communication process without 
contract signing. 
Hike at node communication execution time 
that is negligible when consider the improvement in 
prevention of node reliability tampering attack attempts. 
 
Fig. 1 : Attack success rate on NRIM and SNRIM 
 
Fig. 2 : Average time taken to finish service request in 
SNRIM and NRIM 
VI. Conclusion 
Here in this paper we proposed a signcryption 
based contract signing for node communication based 
on node reliability check. The results are evident that 
proposed two way node reliability checking model is 
effective to avoid the node reliability tampering attack 
efforts. The planned model is screening a little hike in 
average process time of node communication, which 
can be negligible in the context of node reliability 
tampering attack avoidance. In future we plan to find a 
solution to avoid the contract sign breaching. 
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